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A smart city is an interconnection of technological components that store, process, and wirelessly transmit 
information to enhance the efficiency of applications and the individuals who use those applications. Over the 
course of the 21st century, it is expected that an overwhelming majority of the world’s population will live in urban 
areas and that the number of wireless devices will increase. The resulting increase in wireless data transmission 
means that the privacy of data will be increasingly at risk. This paper uses a holistic problem-solving approach 
to evaluate the security challenges posed by the technological components that make up a smart city, specifically 
radio frequency identification, wireless sensor networks, and Bluetooth. The holistic focus in turn permits a set of 
technical and ethical approaches that can combat malicious attacks and enhance data security across the networks 
that drive smart cities.
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1. Introduction 
As cities become increasingly connected through smart 
technologies and as current big data collection practices 
continue to go unchecked, information privacy has the 
potential to diminish. If procedures on data handling and 
security are not standardized early in the implementation of 
cyber-physical systems and Internet of Things (IoT) systems, 
then privacy gaps and invasive data mining will likely arise. 
These threats have the potential to affect the advancement 
of smart cities, as citizens may feel their privacy rights are 
unduly compromised, which in turn may undermine public 
support. In order to protect the right to privacy from invasive 
attacks on vulnerable networks and devices in emerging 
smart cities, solutions that address both social and technical 
aspects of the issue must be devised and analyzed. 
Smart cities are a collection of interconnected technologies 
that can communicate with one another to monitor, collect, 
interpret, and distribute data. These entwined devices 
make up the IoT, a global network of wirelessly-connected 
devices. A smart city is constructed of a network-based 
foundation that contains appliances and infrastructures that 
in turn contain sensors, software, and electrical components. 
The broader purposes of smart cities vary from customer 
convenience to power reduction. The technological foundat- 
ion of smart cities rests on three primary elements: radio 
frequency identification (RFID) for identification and 
tracking, wireless sensor networks (WSN) which are stand-
alone networks for measuring data, and Bluetooth for 
connecting separate devices. 
To understand and develop a solution to a problem, one 
must understand the complexity of its dimensions. This 
is done through holistic problem solving, an approach for 
examining elements, relationships, and the system dynamics 
of a complex problem. According to the Penn State College 
of Agricultural Sciences (n.d.), a complex problem, also 
known as a “wicked” problem, cannot be solved by a 
single solution. The problem with privacy in a smart city is 
complicated because of the value placed on privacy, as well as 
the technological underpinnings within such cities. Multiple 
stakeholders with different levels of interest, connection, and 
power shape the problem. Data security may be presented 
in many alternative methods, so a single solution will be 
insufficient to address the various interests of stakeholders.
The first step of a holistic approach, and the focus of this 
paper, is to determine the problem through framing. Framing 
is describing and interpreting the problem by choosing which 
aspects to prioritize and which to leave in the background. 
Framing lessens the complexity of the problem by narrowing 
the scope to a specific area of interest, and thus allows for a 
more scientific problem statement (Bartee, 1973). Potential 
solutions must then be analyzed holistically to determine 
their effectiveness and to understand how they will impact 
the various stakeholders. 
The larger problem is how to ensure users’ rights to privacy 
in a growing technological world. Using a holistic problem-
solving approach, this paper identifies technical solutions 
that employ existing and emerging RFID, WSN, and 
Bluetooth technologies, along with policy solutions that 
begin to address the social and ethical issues involved in 
building smart cities. 
2. Framing the Issue 
2.1 Smart Cities and Privacy
Smart cities are designed to improve the lives of citizens 
by creating an environment that continuously adapts and 
monitors data collection (Cui et al., 2018; Eckhoff & Wagner, 
2018; Sookhak et al., 2019). Amsterdam implemented its 
smart city plan with the intent of reducing CO2 emissions 
among infrastructure and people through smart building 
management systems, ship-to-grid power connections, and 
climate streets that feature LED lights, waste reduction 
systems, and smart meters (Šťáhlavský, 2011; Alaverdyan, 
2018). Vienna proudly advertises its commitment as a smart 
city to “digital data (mined using state-of-the-art technologies 
and analytical methods) to support decision-making and for 
real-time management of urban systems” (Stadt Wien, n.d.). 
China alone has more than 200 smart city plans in progress 
(Cui et al., 2018).
In these cities, multiple data sources from different data 
holders, devices, and applications can be combined to 
achieve city efficiency. However, doing so increases the risk 
of information being intercepted, which can have severe 
consequences (Eckhoff & Wagner, 2018). Applications 
which can collect highly sensitive data like citizen location 
or private documents may be used by system hackers 
(Sookhak et al., 2019). For instance, the Dyn company 
was hit with denial-of-service attacks in 2016 that saturated 
its infrastructure and disrupted host services (Khatoun & 
Zeadally, 2017). Additionally, a 2015 study demonstrated 
that a 2014 Jeep Cherokee could be hacked and controlled 
wirelessly by exploiting the vehicle’s Uconnect system (Miller 
& Valasek, 2015). This shows that the harm of infringing on 
someone’s privacy—for example, by locating an individual 
within a particular vehicle—can be immediate and physical. 
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2.2 Privacy and Security
Privacy is jeopardized by malicious attacks. There are two 
primary types of attacks: physical and system. Physical at-
tacks take advantage of a device in a physical manner and 
are not associated with network intervention. Examples of 
physical attacks include disabling devices, modifying devices, 
and cloning tags (Khattab et al., 2017). System attacks use 
malicious software to acquire information (Attacks, 2015). 
There are several common types of system attacks:
• Spoofing - impersonating another individual or   
 computer system
• Insertion - sending new messages from a host
• Replay - repeating or delaying data
• Relay - intercepting/manipulating messages                                     
   between two parties
• Denial-of-Service (DoS) - disrupting services of a              
   network-connected host
• Skimming - capturing information from a cardholder     
3. Smart City Technologies
3.1 RFIDs, WSNs, and Bluetooth
While privacy issues are raised by data collection practices 
used by smart cities and the companies they support, 
problems may also occur through potential security breaches. 
Smart cities track the identity and movement of objects 
through RFID tags, which combine a microchip and an 
antenna to store, process, and then relay or actively send data 
(Dominikus & Kraxberger, 2011; Juels et al., 2003). Data 
in RFID tags is processed and sent through a vulnerable 
wireless network that connects each tag to its reader (Singh, 
2013). The reader sends an electromagnetic wave that drives 
the internal circuit of the tag to send data to the user if the 
signal is strong enough (Singh, 2013). 
Tracking and identifying objects within a smart city is 
necessary to provide inventory accuracy, advanced security, 
and efficiency for everyday usage. For instance, RFID tags 
are used for monitoring and analyzing locations, such as a 
greenhouse environment, or information stored on health 
devices (Subramanian et al., 2005). RFID tags can also be 
used to gain access to a compound or facility because the 
reader is able to locate the corresponding tag to gain access. 
The tags function in the same manner in cases that require 
bus entry, card access, or personnel tracking. RFID tags are 
also capable of detecting small concentrations of explosives 
and other dangerous chemicals (Subramanian et al., 2005).
Smart cities may also rely on WSNs, spatially diverse collec-
tions of sensors that monitor and gather data through con-
necting networks to support a range of operations (Conti, 
2016). These operations include surveillance, rescue support, 
fire prevention, and air pollution monitoring (Conti, 2016). 
WSNs have a vast range of sensor nodes and data storage 
receivers that can monitor physical and environmental con-
ditions. 
Additionally, smart cities may use Bluetooth technology 
to transfer data between devices. Bluetooth is based on a 
primary/replica relationship between devices. This means 
that one device has unidirectional control over the other. 
Using this relationship, Bluetooth can create ad hoc short-
range networks whose wireless traffic can be observed by 
malicious users within a densely populated area. Securing this 
wireless communication can increase the privacy individuals 
have when communicating on these channels.
3.2 Privacy Implications 
RFID tags are inexpensive, and connecting them to the IoT 
is relatively easy; however, security protocols and frameworks 
must be analyzed to secure the data transmission within a 
network. Due to the use of these tags in a connected city, 
data must be secured properly to prevent hacking. RFID 
tags store information as well as track and monitor objects 
or people. This can result in a violation of one’s privacy if 
this information is obtained. However, due to the constraints 
of RFID tags, such as limitations in memory size, energy, 
and response time, only specific security protocols can be 
implemented (Dominikus & Kraxberger, 2011). RFID tag 
memory can be increased, but it would be costly. Currently, 
RFID tags can hold an average of 64 kB of data depending on 
the type of tag (Dominikus & Kraxberger, 2011). According 
to Dominkus and Kraxberger (2011), these limitations of 
memory “could be a problem for the proposed security layer 
protocols” (p. 2647).
Security protocols can be different for the different types of
RFID tags available: active, semi-active, and passive. Active
and semi-active tags are powered by a battery; however, ac-
tive tags automatically send information while semi-active
remain dormant until receiving a reader signal (Dominikus
& Kraxberger, 2011). In contrast, passive tags do not have
a power source and require energy from the reader to send
information (Dominikus & Kraxberger, 2011). Each of these
tags has different byte sizes and ranges to account for when
looking at its security framework (Singh, 2013). Because
passive tags hold less memory and are cheaper to produce,
they are more susceptible to attacks compared to active and
semi-active tags (Singh, 2013).
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WSNs provide high accessibility to data flows, but the “open” 
nature of the channel makes them prone to hacking (Khan 
& Mauri, 2014). WSNs are multivariate, meaning they are 
immune to computer attacks, which increases their security. 
However, adding mobility to any technology increases its 
vulnerability to security threats. Data is sent over the network 
with a larger range, increasing the time it takes for data to be 
received. 
With any technical device, there are constraints on its 
security implementation. That is to say, all security devices 
have resource requirements. For WSNs, there are limitations 
such as memory and power. The memory of a WSN can 
only hold 178 bytes for code storage in a TelosB with a 10K 
RAM, 48K program memory, and 1024K flash storage, thus 
providing limited storage for implementing security protocols 
(Conti, 2016). Additionally, encryption, decryption, and 
the transmission and storage of security data all consume 
power. This energy consumption limits the life span of the 
node (Khan & Mauri, 2014). Multi-hop routing, network 
congestion, and node processing can lead to greater latency 
in the network (Conti, 2016). High latency makes it difficult 
to achieve synchronization among sensor nodes. 
Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE) can be a cost-, time- and 
energy-efficient way of securely pairing mobile devices within 
a smart city where they are able to join or leave a network 
dynamically (Garcia, 2018). The security of each device is 
essential to the security of the entire network. If the devices 
of a network are not endowed with the same level of security, 
this creates a backdoor which can allow malicious activity to 
enter the network. Malicious attacks can cause technologies 
to be susceptible to detailed scans exposing informational 
parameters, service profiles, or even personal data (Haase & 
Handy, 2004).
4. RFID Technical Solutions 
If smart cities rely on RFID technologies, as is expected, 
security measures must be analyzed to ensure that data being 
sent over a wireless network is secure. Sensitive data is often 
found in devices that track information on an object, provide 
access to facilities, and transmit across the network. Security 
solutions have been devised at both the network and physical 
levels.
4.1 RFID Authentication and Eavesdropping
At the network level, RFIDs need to be authenticated 
properly to prevent hackers from eavesdropping on data 
transmission.One suggestion has been to make “Smart 
RFID” tags that generate their own random pseudo IDs so 
that a passive eavesdropper cannot encrypt the signal being 
sent by the reader (Juels et al., 2003; Sobti & Geetha, 2012). 
In this approach, A-TRAP protocols exchange three values 
generated pseudo-randomly between the tag and server (Le 
et al., 2007). The server checks to ensure that a designated 
value is in the database before accepting the tag as authentic. 
A-TRAP protocols offer “secure authentication, forward-
anonymity, availability, and key-indistinguishability,” but 
cannot withstand sustained attacks or instances when the 
tag is lost (Le et al., 2007, p. 13). Later proposed protocols 
generated four and five pseudo-random values to anonymize 
the communication between the server and the tag and to 
prevent replay attacks (Le et al., 2007). Despite the growing 
sophistication of these key mechanisms, as Avoine et al. 
(2011) pointed out a decade ago, they remain vulnerable to 
compromise in open communities with more open networks. 
4.2 RFID Denial-of-Service Attacks 
Connecting tags to the IoT system in a smart city makes them 
prone to attacks in an open network. One possibility is to use 
IPv6 to defend RFID tags against DoS attacks (Dominikus 
& Kraxberger, 2011). IPv6 is the most recent version of the 
Internet Protocol, and it uses 128-bit addresses to identify 
and locate devices on the network and route traffic across 
the Internet (Dominikus & Kraxberger, 2011). According 
to Dominikus and Kraxberger (2011), a reader could track 
the communication with a mobile IPv6-enabled tag while 
also blocking attacks from suspicious nodes. Timeout values, 
which end one connection and accept new connection 
attempts, can also be randomized to defend against hackers. 
4.3 Physical Solutions to RFID Attacks
The ability to “kill” RFID tags when a good is purchased can 
be useful because dead RFID tags cannot collect consumer 
data (Juels et al., 2003). Similarly, the ability to put RFID 
tags to sleep allows users to turn tags on and off when desired 
(Sitlia et al., 2009). A more secure method of defending 
against physical attacks is through blocker tags. Blocker 
tags are RFID tags that can block readers from reading the 
identification of tags that exist in the blocker tag’s range 
(Juels et al., 2003; Sitlia et al., 2009).
5. WSN Technical Solutions 
Wireless sensor networks continuously monitor an 
environment to gather and organize sensitive information 
regarding city infrastructure. If this data were intercepted or 
if the technologies were hacked, one could obtain control 
over a spatial environment. Solutions have been devised to 
secure these technologies and their data. 
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5.1 WSN Authentication and Confidentiality 
Public-key cryptosystems are an effective method for 
securing WSN authentication and confidentiality. Some of 
the major techniques used in public-key cryptosystems are 
the Rivest, Shamir, and Adleman scheme (RSA), Elliptic 
Curve Cryptography (ECC), and Multivariate Quadratic 
Quasigroups (MQQ) (Gligoroski et al., 2008). Each of 
these techniques provides different efficiency, security, and 
memory usage, shown in Table 1. The design of ECC is tough 
to develop, but its complexity makes the system difficult to 
crack (Quirino et al., 2012).
Table 1: Public-Key Cryptosystem Comparisons
Note. Adapted from “Asymmetric Encryption in Wireless Sensor 
Networks” by G. Quirino, A. Ribeiro, and E. Moreno, 2012, 
(https://doi.org/10.5772/48464).
5.2 ECCE Protocol 
One experimental solution for WSN security concerns 
proposed by Conti et al. (2007) is an Enhanced Cooperative 
Channel Establishment (ECCE). The purpose of this 
protocol is to allow a secure wireless channel between two 
sensors that do not share any pre-deployed key (Conti et al., 
2007). According to Conti et al. (2007), “in comparison 
with other protocols, ECCE performs effectively in “channel 
existence and channel resilience” when faced with an attacker 
(p. 61). 
5.3 SPINS
A third solution is the use of SPINS, a secure communication 
protocol proposed by Perrig et al. (2002) that prevents 
eavesdropping and active attacks in wireless sensor networks. 
There are “two secure building blocks” associated with the 
SPINS protocol: SNEP and µTesla (Perrig et al., 2002, p. 
521). 
Secure Network Encryption Protocol (SNEP) uses a two-
party authentication protocol that provides confidentiality 
between the two corresponding parties (Perrig et al., 2002). 
A common protocol used for data authentication is the 
Message Authentication Code (MAC), which sends a message 
and a signature (Ullah et al., 2009). When the message has 
been obtained, the receiver performs a computation on the 
message and compares the generated message’s MAC value 
to the sent MAC value to determine if the message is from 
a legitimate user (Ullah et al., 2009). This process makes it 
feasible to use the SNEP protocol for the network system. 
SNEP “has low communication overhead” and “only adds 8 
bytes per message” (Perrig et al., 2002, p. 524). Therefore, it 
wouldn’t take up too many resources to use this protocol in a 
wireless sensor network. 
µTesla, an experimental, “‘micro’ version of the Timed 
Efficient Streaming Loss-tolerant Authentication protocol 
(TESLA), [provides] authenticated screening broadcast” 
(Ullah et al., 2009, p. 333). µTesla uses asymmetry through 
a delayed disclosure of symmetric keys, which results in 
an effective broadcast authentication scheme (Ullah et al., 
2009). Asymmetric cryptographic mechanisms by themselves 
are resource-intensive and require a significant amount of 
computation (Perrig et al., 2002). By using µTesla, this issue 
can be efficiently resolved. 
6. Bluetooth Technical 
Solutions
There are two key Bluetooth protocols: traditional Bluetooth 
and Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE). Bluetooth resides within 
the IEEE 802.15 protocol family dedicated for personal area 
networks (i.e., the networks for connecting an individual 
person’s devices). If Bluetooth is to be implemented within 
smart cities on a wide scale, traditional Bluetooth will not 
suffice. Traditional Bluetooth design requires one watt of 
power consumption and operates at a data transmission rate 
of 25 Mbps while BLE is ~2 Mbps (Bulíc et al., 2019). Un-
fortunately, a reduced capacity for security follows suit with 
this reduced data transmission rate and lowered power con-
sumption, similar to most wireless device communications.
 
During the pairing process, devices exchange their specific 
security and functionality capabilities. If the device-relative 
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capabilities are supported, the primary device will generate 
a temporary key, which will be used to produce the short-
term key. The short-term key is then used to encrypt the data 
transferred between devices. 
By contrast, the bonding process does persist across connec-
tions between devices to bypass the pairing phase on sub-
sequent connections. In order to bond two devices to each 
other, they must engage in an initial pairing process. Bond-
ing uses a long-term key stored on each device to encrypt the 
communication channel between them.
The different levels of security for Bluetooth depend on 
the capabilities of each device. If Bluetooth v4.2 or later is 
used, then the connection can be further secured, though 
not 100% secured. BLE v4.2 offers an enhanced security 
process utilizing the Diffie-Hellman algorithm, which allows 
two devices to generate a shared key on each side. Still, 
the security of the locally stored keys is imperative to BLE 
security (Kainda et al., 2009).
Unfortunately, Bluetooth devices authenticate devices rather 
than the users of devices. To investigate and enhance user 
authentication, a study was conducted in 2009 to test the 
usability of different methods for pairing secure devices 
(Kainda et al., 2009). Kainda et al. (2009) found that the 
“Compare & Confirm” method shown in Table 2 is the 
easiest for users to interface with as they pair unfamiliar 
devices. In addition, no security failures arose during the 
study using the “Compare & Confirm” method, suggesting 
that it is promising for increasing security (Kainda et al., 
2009).
To help the general public realize that these low energy 
devices result in low security, they should be informed of 
their vulnerabilities. However, the public should also be made 
aware of possible methods for securing Bluetooth devices.
 
When pairing Bluetooth devices, Out-of-Band (OOB) 
channels should be implemented with personal identification 
numbers as opposed to link keys. This approach should 
prevent persistent man-in-the-middle attacks in an open 
environment where attackers can snoop for keys sent between 
devices. Additionally, these PINs should be set to a longer 
value that includes both letters and numbers. However, this 
technique would be restricted to devices which have displays.
An active attack increases the amount of power it consumes 
as a result of the increased traffic it receives and potentially 
distributes. Even if the attack is unsuccessful, the increased 
Table 2: Potential Bluetooth Pairing Methods
Note. Adapted from “Usability and Security of Out-of-Band Chan-
nels in Secure Device Pairing Protocols” by R. Kainda, I. Flechais, and 
A. Roscoe, 2009, (https://doi.org/10.1145/1572532.1572547).
power consumption renders the targeted device offline, 
thereby reducing the capabilities of the Bluetooth network. 
Restricting a device’s power consumption rate will reduce the 
propensity for this issue to occur. 
7. Ethical Frameworks for Privacy 
and Cybersecurity
The big questions concerning the ethics of big data not only 
pertain to what information is being collected, but also “who 
and what is subjected to analysis” (Crawford et al., 2014, 
p. 1666). That is, might some people be subjected to more 
scrutiny than others? Questions of justice must be considered
when the benefits and risks of data collection in a smart city 
are unevenly distributed.
One issue with big data is the ability to link specific 
information with an identity. However, if an identity is not 
associated with information, is it ethical to use this data 
for analysis? The answer may vary depending on whether 
it serves civil, commercial, or private interest. Civil interest 
would include, for example, estimating the number of 
people by pinging devices for public transportation in the 
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interest of efficiency. This would not link identity, but rather 
the number of devices in a specific location. 
Commercial interest describes collecting and analyzing 
data for a profit motive, which may include using Internet 
browsing history and recent purchases to predict what a 
user would most likely be interested in. This practice links 
an identity to data, which could be deemed unethical 
depending whether the practice is transparent and done 
with user consent. Ethical dilemmas regarding data analysis 
will be raised by smart cities. It is important for the public 
to assess the dangers of unethical data usage early on in the 
development of smart cities so that policymaking does not 
lag too far behind the technological advancement these cities 
will bring. Once smart cities are already built, it will be much 
more difficult to rethink how they address privacy.
8. Policy Approach
Smart cities are still in the early stages of development. This 
means that privacy and security concerns will continue 
to arise, but it also means there is an opportunity now to 
build smart cities with stakeholders’ interests in mind. The 
severity of privacy issues will depend on how smart cities are 
governed. In this section, we weigh the best policy scenarios 
for a developing smart city.
Smart cities will involve vast amounts of information, 
processed by artificial intelligence or people for the sake of 
learning individual or societal trends. This information will 
be analyzed for a range of purposes, from running more 
efficient in-city transportation to supporting company profit 
motives (Walker, 2019). Private information, such as one’s 
daily routine, hobbies, and interests, could be acquired by 
different actors for different purposes. Unlike traditional 
urban areas, “smart cities have become data-centric projects 
focusing on the constant generation, collection, and 
processing of data” (What Are Smart Cities?!, 2008). With 
information constantly relaying from device to device, proper 
security protocols and management of this information 
needs to be regulated by governing entities to ensure privacy 
and security for citizens, companies, and governments are 
maintained. 
There is a growing push to regulate data for privacy purposes. 
For example, there is a movement within the United States 
“calling on the federal government to create an entirely new 
federal agency tasked with data privacy protection” (Krishan, 
2019). An approach in the context of smart cities would be 
to create mandatory government authorizations to handle 
different types of information. Additionally, there should 
be rules and procedures governing the use and sharing of 
data. A state level government agency should oversee data 
flow along with issuing these authorizations to ensure local 
control in the smart city developing process. Its purpose 
would be to inspect and investigate companies suspected of 
illegal information practices. This will make data harder to 
obtain while also punishing individuals or companies who 
mishandle it. 
Table 3: Data Priority Tiers
Note. Adapted from “District of Columbia Data Policy” by Office 
of the Mayor, April 27, 2017, (https://octo.dc.gov/sites/default/files/
dc/sites/octo/page_content/attachments/2017-115_District-of-Colum-
bia-Data-Policy.pdf ).
Data makes a smart city function. Therefore, it is important 
to help the public recognize that not all data has the same level 
of sensitivity. To do this, data could be classified into tiers 
like those displayed in Table 3. Smart cities might consider 
creating data regulatory agencies to oversee this classification 
system. As Washington D.C. has done with its dataset 
classification levels, higher tiers could correspond to greater 
security risks and greater offenses if information is mishandled 
or stolen (Office of the Mayor, 2017). For example, Tier 1 
could include data not linked to individual identity. The data 
regulatory agency might determine that accessing this tier of 
data does not need authorization except for specific cases. 
de Groot (2019) summarizes three principles for classifying 
data: context, content, and user. Context-based classification 
looks for sensitive information; content-based classification 
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“looks at application, location, or creator,” and user-based 
classification “relies on user knowledge and discretion at 
creation, edit, review, or dissemination” (de Groot, 2019).
Authorizations to handle this information would be issued 
by the data regulatory agency. These authorizations would 
ensure proper care for the different types of data and hold 
those accountable who use it incorrectly or jeopardize 
its privacy/integrity. The agency could also coordinate 
inspections to make sure companies and other entities are 
complying with proper data protocols.
Predicting the future outcomes of a smart city will steer 
development as well. A societal shift concerning the 
importance of data must be viewed as an important step 
in smart city development. An informed public should be 
the first step toward protecting privacy. Smart cities involve 
uncertainties which means many legislative decisions may be 
made in a reactive manner; however, steps can be taken to 
proactively protect privacy at this early stage of development. 
This can be done through planning and the construction of 
a data governing framework. This should push the citizens 
affected by the new framework to better understand the 
system and what it means for them. 
9. Conclusions 
Smart cities prioritize efficient systems over privacy. This will 
continue to be the case “as the amount of data gathered via 
the IoT continues to grow” (Newman, 2019). Privacy will 
always be a major concern in smart cities due to the vast 
collection of data through many systems. Many of these 
systems link identity with the data. This poses a threat to 
privacy and raises questions: Who owns and analyzes this 
data, and, as Newman (2019) asked, “At what point does the 
data collection become too much?” and “When is privacy 
more important than convenience?”
 
With a society that is constantly connected to a network, 
privacy will be a concern due to the prevalence of data 
breaches and hackings. Devices constantly collect and 
analyze data whether citizens have agreed to it or not. To 
implement security practices that ensure data integrity and 
confidentiality, a holistic analysis is required to understand 
the interconnected systems that collectively comprise a 
smart city. If a holistic approach is not taken, many “well-
intentioned efforts [could] lead to policy resistance, where 
our policies are delayed, diluted, or defeated by unforeseen 
reactions” (Sterman, 2000). Additionally, while technical 
solutions can address and even anticipate hackers’ security 
attacks, only policy planning can control how data will 
collected and design how it will be used.
Complex problems rarely have simple solutions; therefore, 
it is important to assess all dimensions of a smart city before 
implementing change. It is also important to understand 
what these changes might do to the system because none 
of the proposed solutions work independently from one 
another. They are all a part of the same system to combat the 
interference of hacking and the invasion of privacy. Due to 
the complex nature of the problem, technical and regulatory 
solutions must be devised to work hand in hand to protect 
privacy as smart cities progress.
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